



General Conference

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Forty-Seventh (2003) Regular Session

Plenary

Record of the First Plenary Meeting

Held at the Austria Center Vienna on Monday, 15 September 2003, at 10.05 a.m.

Temporary President: Mr. RAJASA (Indonesia)

President: Mr. TAKASU (Japan)

Iran 205-209

205. Mr. AGHAZADEH (Islamic Republic of Iran), recalling that on 12 September the Board of Governors had adopted a resolution relating to his country's nuclear programme, said that his delegation objected not only to the content of the resolution but also to the manner in which it had been developed and negotiated. The resolution went beyond the letter and the spirit of the NPT and the Agency's Statute, and even beyond the provisions of the additional protocol which his country was currently negotiating. The Iranian delegation had been unable to associate itself with the resolution, which had been pushed to a decision through the attribution to the Secretariat of opinions that it did not hold, through arm-twisting in many capitals and through the disregarding of views expressed and amendments proposed by 15 members of the Non-Aligned Movement and by others, including some co-sponsors of the draft resolution. The entire exercise had been an example of unilateralism at its worst - namely, unilateralism wearing a multilateralist cloak.

206. His country believed that there was more to the resolution than met the eye - that there was an underlying agenda directed towards an escalation of tension and chaos for the purpose of diverting attention from serious issues of partisan politics in the United States. The heavy-handed approach adopted in pushing through the resolution cast serious doubt on the resolution's practical usefulness; one could not help feeling that the resolution had been formulated in such a way as to guarantee its non-implementation or at best its semi-implementation, rather than to promote the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. The resolution was inconsistent with the NPT, set a deadline for co-operation and contained venomous language - all very problematic features. His authorities, whose preliminary views he had just expressed, were studying the resolution carefully and would respond to it officially within a few days.

207. Meanwhile, he considered it important to underline that:

- his country was fully committed to the NPT not only because of the obligations which it had assumed pursuant to it, but also on religious and ethical grounds;
- for strategic reasons, his country's policies and actions were geared to strengthening the safeguards regime;
- his country, in planning to develop a nuclear power generation capacity of 7000 MW(e), wished to help strengthen the safeguards regime by concluding an additional protocol or taking some other action that would encourage the international community to seriously urge others in the Middle East to respond positively to his country's initiative aimed at making the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
- the efforts of his country to resolve outstanding issues through steadily increasing co-operation between it and the Agency were being opposed by parties seeking to disrupt that co-operation;
- the resolution adopted by the Board was counter-productive in that it had interrupted a process which would undoubtedly have resulted in full transparency and a restoration of confidence;
- his country was willing to seek ways of salvaging that process and keeping the issue under consideration within the framework of the Agency, under the direction of the Director General, account being taken of the interpretation placed by most Board members on the resolution;
- his country, as a party to the NPT, had an undeniable right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes;
- his country would continue to co-operate with the Agency within the framework of comprehensive safeguards; and
- his country would, as already stated by the Iranian Government, continue negotiating with the Agency on the additional protocol.

208. The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believed that the only way to counter challenges emanating from the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear Powers and from the proliferation of nuclear weapons was to strengthen the relevant international instrument through multilateral, comprehensive and non-discriminatory efforts, and that the NPT was the cornerstone of international efforts to achieve complete nuclear disarmament and halt vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. The essential question remaining was which country would accept the blame for providing Israel with nuclear weapons in contravention of its relevant NPT obligations.

209. The effectiveness of the NPT depended on full compliance with all its provisions by all parties. The credibility of the NPT would be undermined by selective and discriminatory approaches to its implementation.