

In the name of God



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ

Permanent Mission of
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Statement

by

H.E. Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh
Resident Representative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA

before the

IAEA Board of Governors

29 November 2012

*In the Name of God,
the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful*

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues;

I am obliged to put on record the appreciation for the indispensable sustained support of the Non-Aligned Movement regarding the protection of Iran's inalienable right for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy during the last decade. The Movement's struggle for peace and disarmament, for the establishment of justice and by its valuable contributions to the International Organizations have made an unprecedented record, a golden chapter in the history of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Mr. Chairman,

It is now a decade since the Agency is dealing with Iran's nuclear issue which has been politicized by certain western countries. I decided to have an innovative approach in order to derail from traditional trend merely elaborating on reports of Director General, and commenting on some repeated normally provocative statement of some western countries.

I have gathered over 50 most relevant questions on Iran's nuclear policy and activities which are normally addressed by some member states or public. I have tried to respond on the basis of legal documents, over 30 reports of the Director General, and the realities on the ground.

Based on these factual information elaborated in the responses to 50 questions, no doubt is left that the file has to be closed immediately and safeguards return to routine manner. This is the only way that encourages Iran to show more flexibility in taking voluntary steps.

Among the questions, there are some essential straightforward ones:

1- Has Agency found smoke gun in Iran (recalling the unfounded US allegations on Iraq) , any evidence of diversion of even a gram of uranium be diverted to military purposes after the 7500 person-days inspection, unprecedented in the history of the IAEA?

The answer is simply No.

2- Why the file is still open?

Some western countries, specifically the United States, under the pretext of Iran's nuclear issue, allegations of possible military dimensions, want to change the Agency mandate from a technical nuclear material driven safeguards to intelligence information driven safeguards in order to be able to enter national security domain of member states, mainly developing countries without any restriction. Note that the main countries pursuing such hidden agenda are not

affected by such security intrusiveness since they are not covered by comprehensive safeguards.

3- Have the involvement of the UN Security Council in the technical affairs of the IAEA, adoption of resolution and imposing sanctions been effective?

The answer is simply No. Sanctions, threat of attacks against nuclear installations, barbaric terrorist assassinations of nuclear scientists have strengthen the determination of Iran to pursue peaceful nuclear activities including enrichment, and has further united the noble nation of Iran to protect its in-alienable right envisaged in the Agency's statute and the NPT. The reports of Director General, including the last one proves this assertion.

4- What are the immediate consequences of the continuation of such politically motivated trend?

- a- Damage to the legitimacy of the UN Security Council and its resolutions, since Iran shall not implement the ones on Iran due to lack of legal basis;
- b- Further polarization and politicization of the IAEA, specifically the Board of Governors;
- c- A serious damage to the NPT and its universality, since Iran is paying the price of being party to the NPT where the non-parties are exempted from Agency's surveillance and are not facing political pressure or sanctions;
- d- Discouragement of developing countries to join or ratify other similar treaties such as CTBT.

5- Q- Why the negotiation between Iran and the IAEA on so-called structured approach has not yet been concluded?

Answer:

- i. Director General has prevented reference to previous modality on resolution of outstanding issues including alleged studies, document IFCIRC/711, negotiated and agreed by Iran and the Agency, by his predecessor, endorsed by the Board of Governors;
- ii. Director General has blocked by putting bracket on the language agreed by negotiating teams, regarding the important issue of delivery of alleged documents to Iran, as bargaining chip for the future. The remote instructions by DG and not giving full authority to the negotiating team is also another reason for lack of success on timely manner.
- iii. At the peak of negotiation in Tehran aiming at conclusion of the text, Director General took all by surprise asking Iran with short notice to grant access to Parchine military site simultaneously. Iran informed the team its agreement to give access after the framework, structured approach is concluded, the team could even visit Parchine during the following week.

But Director General did not agree and had a press release that Iran has denied access to Parchine, thus the issue which was professionally dealt with by Agency and Iran team, went out of their auspices to media , became a political issue, discussed in the streets, jeopardized the conducive environment.

- iv. Iran invited the team for next round of talks in Tehran on 15 October 2012, Agency welcomed and Director General was supposed to inform the Board of Governors in September in the course of his introductory statement. He did not do so. Another resolution was passed against Iran in return to its positive step.
- v. Immediately after I announced again our readiness to receive Agency team on 13 December 2012, Director General made an interview on Parchine in Baghdad which created serious political problem for those pursuing cooperative approach with the IAEA, including my team in charge of negotiation.
- vi. Today's opening statement was surely not helpful for the next joint step. As I advised in several occasion the Secretariat has to report after professional verification is over. Speculations based on intelligence services or some satellite photos have been in several occasion damaged the Agency professional credibility.
- vii. The Director General has made comment, yesterday, regarding claimed activities in the vicinity of the requested location in Parchine. He claimed: *"these activities will have seriously undermined the Agency's ability to undertake effective verification"*. This statement posed a serious doubt about the intention, the necessity and utility of the visit to Parchine anymore. I recall that in case of Israeli attack against Syrian State, DG insisted that the Agency want to visit the site although bombarded by Israel rather than asking the information from aggressor. DG is not claiming that the Agency's verification is undermined due to the bombardment. This is a clear contradiction. Undoubtedly, such contradictory statement creates political tension and serious obstacle to conclude the process of negotiation on structured approach in good spirit and to pave the way for its implementation accordingly. Therefore Iran should not be blamed for delay.

6- Is there any breakthrough solution to the existing stalemate?

The answer is yes. The parties concerned have to accept the reality, namely Iran is master of enrichment technology, it has paid heavy political, economic, security price therefore it shall never suspend again such peaceful activities being under Agency's full scope safeguards. The Islamic Republic of Iran is however well prepared to find a negotiated face saving solution and a breakthrough from the existing stalemate.

Mr. Chairman,

I only read some of the questions and answers due to time constraint with the assumption that the text including the rest of the Q&A are put on the records of the Board of Governors.

The remaining Questions and Answers on Iran's nuclear policy and activities are as follows:

Q1: Why Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons?

A: The followings are the most prominent reasons:

- i. Based on the FATWA, decree, of the Iran's supreme leader as reflected explicitly at the opening statement of the 16th NAM Summit in Tehran, on 30 August 2012; as declared: *"I stress that the Islamic Republic has never been after nuclear weapons and that it will never give up the right of its people to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Our motto is: "Nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons for none." We will insist on each of these two precepts, and we know that breaking the monopoly of certain Western countries on production of nuclear energy in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is in the interest of all independent countries, including the members of the Non-Aligned Movement."* And also stated: *"The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar weapons as a great and unforgivable sin. We proposed the idea of "Middle East free of nuclear weapons" and we are committed to it. This does not mean forgoing our right to peaceful use of nuclear power and production of nuclear fuel. On the basis of international laws, peaceful use of nuclear energy is a right of every country. All should be able to employ this wholesome source of energy for various vital uses for the benefit of their country and people, without having to depend on others for exercising this right. Some Western countries, themselves possessing nuclear weapons and guilty of this illegal action, want to monopolize the production of nuclear fuel. Surreptitious moves are under way to consolidate a permanent monopoly over production and sale of nuclear fuel in centres carrying an international label but in fact within the control of a few Western countries."*

- ii. In spite of technical capability and 100,000 victims of chemical weapons as the result of Saddam attacks using deadly chemical agents, Iran did not use any chemical agent due to religious and moral commitments.
- iii. Iran is negotiating with group of 5+1, which includes 5 nuclear weapon states, on the basis of mutual respect and on equal basis. If, hypothetically Iran decides to manufacture nuclear weapons; it would not be able to compete with the nuclear weapon states whom possessing over 20,000 nuclear warheads. As far as number of nuclear weapons is concerned, dealing with 5 nuclear powers would then be at disadvantage and weaker position, no more in an equal footing, as it is the case now, therefore it would be a strategic mistake for Iran to go for nuclear weapons.
- iv. The experiences of the past decades have proved that the nuclear weapons have no use and that on the contrary it creates vulnerability.

Q2: Why Iran pursues nuclear technology?

A: Nuclear technology is the meeting point of the advanced and high standard of various branches of science and engineering. Embarking on nuclear power plants or other applications requires high caliber experts thus the universities have to educate new generation coping with high standard, due to sensitivity of application of nuclear energy specifically safety and security concerns, therefore nuclear technology lead the country to be on advanced one.

Q3: Has the Agency found any activities and nuclear material, which it claimed to be undeclared by Iran diverted to military activities?

A: No. All were accounted by the Agency after declared by Iran, as reflected in all reports of the Director Generals to the Board of Governors since 2003.

Q4: Has the Agency found even a gram of uranium diverted to military purposes after over 7500 person-days of most robust inspections in Iran?

A: No. Refer to all reports to the Board of Governors by of the present and former Director Generals and also yearly Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIR).

Q5: Had Iran any legal obligation to declare the site of Natanz Enrichment Plant before 2003?

A: No. Since the Natanz Enrichment Plant had not received any nuclear material until 2003, thus Iran was not obliged to declare it considering the fact that Iran had not signed the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement of its comprehensive safeguards agreement until 2003.

Q6: Had Iran any legal obligation to declare the site of Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak (IR40) before 2003?

A: No. IR40 had not received any nuclear material yet, and Iran was not obliged to declare it considering the fact that Iran had not signed the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement until 2003.

Q7: Was Iran obliged under its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) to report to the Agency about its Heavy Water Production Plant in Arak?

A: No. Heavy water and its production plant are not covered by the CSA. Therefore, Iran was not obliged to do so.

Q8: Had Iran any legal obligation to declare the site Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) till 2003?

A: No, since the UCF had not received any nuclear material till 2003, thus Iran was not obliged to declare it considering the fact that Iran had not signed the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement till 2003.

Q9: Had Iran any legal obligation to declare any uranium mine including Ghachin and Saghand before 2003?

A: No, since Iran had not signed and implemented the Additional Protocol till 2003.

Q10: Has the Agency been granted access to military sites in Iran?

A: Yes. Iran has granted access to the requested military sites and in the course of Agency visits, over 30 times the Agency has taken samples from the military sites. The results of all analysis proved that there were no evidence of nuclear materials and nuclear activities in those sites (para 49 of GOV/2005/67, para 16 of GOV/2005/87 and paras 32&52 of GOV/2006/15).

Q11: What was the result of inspections from military sites?

A: Former Director General reported that no evidence of nuclear material and activities have been found (paras 41&49 of GOV/2005/67, para 16 of GOV/2005/87 and paras 32&52 of GOV/2006/15). Therefore, the former Safeguards Deputy Director General finally has announced, "Parchin is part of history".

Q12: Has the Agency been permitted to visit Parchin site?

A: Yes, two times in 2004 and 2005. Each time the inspectors chose the locations and Iran cooperated and permitted them to visit the location of their requests (para 41 of GOV/2005/67).

Q13: Has the Agency found any nuclear material and nuclear activities including enrichment in military sites including Parchin and Lavizan-Shian, alleged to be involved in nuclear weapon program, after the Agency did intensive robust inspections including sampling and analysis?

A: No. Director General's Press Statement on Iran on 6 March 2006 said: "*.. on transparency I think I mentioned in my report access to military sites, we have been given access to a number of military sites recently, to Parchin, Lavisan, Shian, to dual use equipment to interview people, these are beyond the Additional Protocol but they are essential for us to reconstruct the history of the programme.*" On 15 November 2004 the DG reported that the Agency was granted to visit the military complex of Lavisan-Shian where the Agency took environmental samples. Finally, paragraph 102 of the DG report (GOV/2004/83) said: "*The vegetation and soil samples collected from the Lavisan-Shian site have been analyzed and reveal no evidence of nuclear material.*" More information are in documents: para 49 of GOV/2005/67, Para 16 of GOV/2005/87, paras 32&52 of GOV/2006/15, para 54 of GOV/2008/4 and para 28 of GOV/2008/15.

Q14: Is the new location requested by the Agency refers to new alleged activity after 2005?

A: No. The Agency claims that it is related to activities alleged to be made over 12 years ago (2000) but they did receive information later (para 50 of GOV/2011/65).

Q15: Is the alleged location in Parchin related to existence of nuclear weapons?

A: No. There is no such claim by the Agency.

Q16: Is alleged location in Parchin used for nuclear explosion test?

A: No. Refer to DG report GOV/2011/65.

Q17: Has the Agency mandate according to the NPT safeguards to enter into conventional military activities investigations?

A: No. The NPT Safeguards (INFCIRC/153 corr.) is based on nuclear material driven system and nothing to do with conventional military activities.

Q18: Has the Agency any legal basis for requesting information related to missiles according to the NPT?

A: No. This is beyond the domain of the Agency mandate and verification capabilities as stipulated in the Agency's statute as well as safeguards under the NPT. One has also to note that there is no International treaty on banning missile manufacturing for conventional defense purposes.

Q19: Are the Agency's cost free experts (getting salaries from their countries) working in the Agency's Safeguards Department being involved with confidential information? What are their nationalities?

A: Yes, mostly from USA and some other western countries.

Q20: Did the Agency declare in its joined agreed Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) that it has no other issues in addition to those listed in 2007?

A: Yes. Paragraph IV of the work plan (INFCIRC/711) reads: *"These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities."*

Q21: Was the Agency obliged to deliver documents on "Alleged Studies" to Iran according to the Work Plan?

A: Yes. Paragraph III of the work plan reads: *"The Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its possession regarding: the Green Salt Project, the high explosive testing and the missile re-entry vehicle."*

Q22: Has the Agency delivered to Iran documents related to the activities that are allegedly claimed to be conducted in Iran?

A: No (as of 27 November 2012). Despite the request by Iran and declarations of the NAM, as well as the criticism of the former Director General (para 23 of GOV/2009/35 and para 19 of GOV/2009/55) who considered prevention of Agency's Secretariat by certain countries to deliver the alleged documents to Iran to defend itself shall jeopardize the verification process, no document has been delivered to Iran.

Q23: Has the Director General agreed to incorporate the language in the structured approach regarding the delivery of Iran documents related to the activities that are allegedly claimed to be conducted in Iran?

A: No (as of 27 November 2012).

Q24: Has the Agency confirmed the authenticity of the materials on “Alleged Studies”?

A: No. Please read the report of the former Director General to the Board of Governors where he raised the problem of authenticity (Para 19, GOV/2009/55). The DG also clearly mentioned that no nuclear material and activities are involved in “Alleged Studies”.

Q25: What was the obligation of Iran according to the document INFCIRC/711 on “Alleged Studies”?

A: Paragraph III of the work plan (INFCIRC/711) negotiated and agreed between Iran and the Agency and further endorsed by the Board of Governors, which reads: “*As a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.*”

Q26: Had Iran any obligation according to the work plan (INFCIRC/711) for meetings, interview, inspection or sampling regarding the Alleged Studies?

A: No. According to the work plan, Iran was only obliged to inform on its assessment. Iran gave its 117-page assessment in 2008. After about 100 hours of joint meeting (which Iran was not obliged to), the Agency however has not fulfilled its obligation closing the work plan yet. While in according to the paragraph IV of the work plan: “*The Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the above work plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a routine manner.*”

It should be also noted that the Agency instead of concluding the work plan, raised new allegations, so called “Possible Military Dimension” whereas it had confirmed in paragraph IV of the work plan that “*there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran’s past nuclear program and activities.*”

Q27: Has Iran implemented the Additional Protocol?

A: Yes. As reflected in the reports of the former Director General before 2006, Iran voluntarily implemented the provisions of Additional Protocol for 2.5 years.

Q28: Has Iran implemented the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement of the Comprehensive Safeguards?

A: Yes. As reflected in the report of the former Director General, Iran was implementing modified code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangement until 2006.

Q29: Since when Iran has suspended voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and the modified Code 3.1 and why?

A: Iranian Parliament approved the suspension of voluntary Additional Protocol and the modified Code 3.1 (after 2.5 years), due to illegally and unjustified referral of Iran's technical nuclear issue to the UN Security Council in 2006. One has to note however that the Additional Protocol is not a legally binding instrument and the modified Code 3.1 was merely a recommendation by the Board of Governors and not an integral legal part of the CSA.

Q30: Has the Board of Governors reacted in impartial manner with the nuclear issues of different states?

A: No. The Board of Governors has applied double standards. An important example is the case of South Korea conducting clandestine enrichment up to 70% and reprocessing producing plutonium. The former Director General declared it as a matter of serious concern. However, the file was closed following the declaration by South Korea that the undeclared activities had been conducted without the knowledge of the Government.

Q31: Is Director General authorized to report the confidential, commercial and industrial nuclear activities information of a state in details to the Board of Governors?

A: No. According to the NPT safeguards (INFCIRC/153 corr.) is not authorized.

Q32: Does the Agency Statute prevent a state to participate in the nuclear safety subjects including meetings, seminars, experts discussions, trainings, etc.?

A: Certainly not. It is very unfortunate that the current DG has taken side and prevented Iranian experts to participate in the safety related activities that hosted by the Agency or Member states.

Q33: What is the status of implementation of Safeguards on nuclear facilities in Iran?

A: Referring to the Agency Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2011, it was reported that “ ... *the Secretariat concluded that, for 2011, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities...* ”, that are covered 167 inspections on 16 facilities with 882 person-days in the field only in 2011. In addition, 1602 accounting reports have been dispatched to the Agency without any delay. (Reference is GOV/2012/18, 2 May 2012)

Q34: Why Iran considers the resolutions of the Board of Governors and the UNSC are illegal?

A: At least, there are 5 legal reasons that the resolutions are illegal:

- i. According to article XII.C of the Agency's Statute: if the inspectors recognize the "non-compliance", they shall report to the Director General, then the DG shall report to the Board of Governors. The Board then reports to the Member States and the UNSC. In case of Iran, never such a procedure was pursued. A few Board members, after about three years, which the issue was raised in the Board in 2003, claimed that there was "non-compliance" before 2003. The DG had however not used the legal phrase "non-compliance" but he used "failures" as used for other countries implementing the CSA. According to the CSA after corrective measures, issues are closed. The former DG clearly reported of all corrective measures by Iran.
- ii. The article XII.C which Board of Governor's resolutions referred to talks about "Recipient Member States" which have misused nuclear material received from the Agency. Iran had never received nuclear material referred to the relevant articles of the Statute.
- iii. According to the Statute and CSA: if the Agency finds out that nuclear material is diverted to military purposes then the UNSC will be informed of that. All reports of the former and present DG have declared that there is no evidence of diversion of nuclear materials.
- iv. According to the CSA: if a Member State prevents inspectors to enter the country thus the Agency is not able to conduct its verification activities, then the UNSC will be informed of this. All reports of the Director General since 2003 clearly declare that the Agency is able to continue its verification in Iran.
- v. The resolutions against Iran by EU3 since 2003 till 2006 recognized the suspension of enrichment by Iran as: non-legally binding, voluntary, and confidence building measure. Therefore, the resolution by the Board of Governors to convey Iran's nuclear issue to the UNSC after Iran decided to stop voluntary suspension of the UCF activities was 100% in contravention with its own previous resolution. It is worth mentioning that when EU3 proposed resolutions against Iran at the Board of Governors in 2006 with political motivation to get the UNSC involved in the technical issue belonging to the Agency, the enrichment activities in Natanz were under voluntary suspension.

Q35: How many person-days of inspection performed in Iran since 2003?

A: Up to now (November 2012), about 7500 person-days of inspections performed.

Q36: Is the Agency able to perform unannounced inspections in Iran?

A: Yes. Iran has agreed on provisions of performing Agency' unannounced inspections in its nuclear facilities. Up to now (November 2012), the Agency has performed over 100 times unannounced inspections with 2 hours short notice.

Q37: Is there prohibition of attack or threat of attack on nuclear installations?

A: Yes. According to the General Conference Resolution 533 of 1990; any attack or threat of attack against nuclear installation during operation or during construction constitute violation of UN charter, Agency statute and International Law, and the UN Security Council has to act immediately. The General Conference in 2009 unanimously endorsed the said resolution.

Q38: Has the Agency Board of Governors or UN Security Council condemned the continuous threat of attack by Israeli regime against Iran's peaceful nuclear installations?

A: No. Regrettably, none of them complied with the resolution 533 of 1990.

Q39: Can military attack stop uranium enrichment in Iran?

A: No. Iran is master of enrichment technology, which produces all components of centrifuge machine. Therefore, it can easily replace the damaged facilities.

Q40: What is the anticipate consequences of military attack against Iran' nuclear installations?

A: Apart from strong reaction against aggressor, as far as the nuclear activities are concerned, it is a normal expectation that the Government shall face tremendous pressure to install centrifuges in more secure places. On other hand, there is a possibility that the parliament forces the Government to stop the Agency inspections or even in the worse scenario withdraw from the NPT.

Q41: What is the end use of 20% enriched uranium?

A: As fuel assemblies for Tehran Research Reactor as well other light water research reactors in the future.

Q42: Why Iran decided to enrich uranium up to 20% and when it was started?

A: Since the fuel for Tehran Research Reactor for production of radiopharmaceutical isotopes was running out, Iran requested the Agency in 2008 in helping acquiring such fuels through potential suppliers. After fruitless lengthy discussions, since patients cannot wait for political decisions, then Iran

decided to produce its indigenous fuels for the Research Reactor in February 2010 that is under the full Agency safeguards surveillance.

Q43: Has Iran tried to get 20% enriched fuel for Tehran research Reactor from potential suppliers?

A: Yes. In June 2008, Iran distributed its request to potential suppliers through the Agency, but no positive answer was received.

Q44: Did Iran agree with the request of other parties in negotiation in 2009 to give its low enriched uranium (~3.5%) in exchange of 20% fuel to be provided by Russia via France?

A: Yes.

Q45: Did Iran officially announce to the Agency based on Tehran Declaration (Brazil & Turkey initiative) its readiness for a swap of 1200 kgs of 3.5% enriched uranium, be transferred to Turkey for a fuel of 20% enriched in return? What was the reaction of western countries to such concession?

A: Yes. A UN Security Council resolution 1929 was passed (Brazil & Turkey voted against).

Q46: Why Iran is continuing the 20% enrichment production?

A: To supply the required fuel for at least a decade of Tehran Research Reactor.

Q47: A concern is expressed that after conversion of 20% enriched uranium to oxide, Iran might convert it back to gaseous form and increase the enrichment. Is the concern technically justified?

A: No. The required chemical process is technically more complicated and economically is not justified to reproduce UF₆ with 20% enrichment, bearing in mind that existing capabilities of 20% enrichment.

Q48: Have the western sanctions been effective in stopping or decreasing enrichment activities in Iran?

A: No. The reports of Director General prove that there is steady progress in enrichment activities including number of installed centrifuge machines. Iran is manufacturing components locally. Thus, western sanctions have had no affect what so ever on the enrichment activities. However, the western sanctions are targeting Iranian patients mostly struggling with cancer.

Q49: Does the majority of the Board of Governors have political approach?

A: Yes. They have shown their different approach on a country like Iran that is a member of NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards on all its nuclear installations are in place that are under continuous monitoring with the Israeli regime which is not a party to the NPT and possessing nuclear weapon that does not allow the Agency inspectors to make inspections, whom threatening of attack of nuclear installations of Iran and in fact it did attack before in Iraq. This is, unfortunately, due to unbalanced and unfair of Board of Governors structure and authorities.

50-Question to peace loving people: Based on the above facts, shall we permit the Agency, which is the sole international technical organization mandated to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity all over world, be further instrumentally used by a few certain countries aiming at turning it to a UN-Watchdog, as a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council, and to deprive developing countries from the “inalienable right” for peaceful uses of nuclear energy as enshrined in the Agency Statute?

Straight forward responses to US and EU

At the eve of next round of negotiations where calm environment is essential for success, US delegate used language of threat that the issue shall be sent to UN Security Council. EU did also follow Washington and used similar hostile tone. This is very disappointing. I have no option but to be reciprocal. I want them not to further deteriorate the situation by immature provocative statements. Why US and some EU members are not learning lessons from the past that Great Nation of Iran has never yielded to pressure during its centuries of civilization. I can understand their feeling of defeat and frustration. That is why I said we are ready to help them to find a face saving solution. Dialogue in civilized manner is the only solution. Therefore I advise them to come to negotiation table from battlefield since I assure them they will be looser otherwise.

I remind their miscalculations on triumph of Islamic revolution, defeating Iran by encouraging and supporting Saddam, forcing Iran to suspend enrichment and instrumental use of UN Security Council. All proved that they have to reconsider attitude and conduct and behave more constructive and stop hostility.