

**Statement by H.E. Ambassador Soltanieh**  
**Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran**  
**before the IAEA Board of Governors**  
**Agenda Item 9(d), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards**  
**Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran**  
**Vienna, 24 September 2008**

In the Name of God the Compassionate the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished Delegates,

At outset, I would like to express the sympathy of my people and Government to the people and Governments loosing their fellow citizens as the results of natural disasters in different countries, such as Cuba and India, and express sorrow to those witnessing their loved ones perish everyday in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Pakistan, as the result of the modern aggressive colonialist policies of few western powers and of the terrorists supported by them.

Mr. Chairman,

I am obliged to express sincere gratitude of my country to the family members of the Non-Aligned Movement for their indispensable support as reflected in the Statement delivered by distinguished Ambassador of Cuba. This statement including the Statement of NAM Ministerial Meeting in

Tehran is a golden chapter in the history of the NAM, as a manifestation of a call for justice and prosperity.

Mr. Chairman,

It is almost six years since the topic of Iran's nuclear issue was first raised in the Board of Governors. Today, I refrain from reviewing the developments since then in detail. I would, however, recall some essential elements for the kind consideration of all Member States of the Agency and the international community at large.

How a simple visit of the Director General upon the invitation of Iran turned into a political crisis?

1- Following the visit of Director General to Natanz Enrichment Facility in 2003, swipe samples were taken.

2- Contamination of low and high enriched uranium particles was found. Iran declared that it is not the result of the enrichment in Iran but has foreign nature. The United States made a lot of noise.

3- Iran voluntarily agreed on a short time suspension in order to give chance to the Agency to perform its technical verification and clarification. After the most robust investigation and analysis, the Agency declared that the contamination was not the result of enrichment in Iran and that the assertion by Iran in 2003 was correct. Based on this result it was expected to promptly remove the issue from the agenda of the Board of Governors.

4- The United States tried to keep the issue in the Board of Governors by bringing new allegations on the eve of each meeting. Although the Director General has reported that all allegations even regarding military sites proved to be baseless, but each time a lot of time and resources of the

Agency was wasted and tremendous financial and political damage was inflicted on Iran.

5- Following the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran taken by the highest level authorities, a Work Plan for the resolution of all past outstanding issues was negotiated with the IAEA and was concluded as joint agreement (INFCIRC/711) on 27 August 2007.

6- The Agency was requested by Iran to put all remaining issues, once and forever, on the table. The Agency gave an exhausted list of 6 outstanding issues considered to be dealt with within the framework of the technical functions of the Agency. Paragraph 2 of chapter IV of the Work Plan says: “The Agency agreed to provide Iran with all remaining questions according to the above work plan. This means that after receiving the questions, no other questions are left. Iran will provide the Agency with the required clarifications and information.”

7- During the negotiations, the Agency requested Iran to also deal with the allegation by United States called “Alleged Studies”, containing only three topics, namely Green Salt, High Explosive and Re-entry Missiles.

8- Iran declared that the issues such as high explosives and re-entry missile are outside the framework of the Agency’s statutory. Iran also declared that so called “alleged studies” of the US lap-top is baseless allegation. However, the Secretariat requested Iran to help clarify and prove its assertion by merely receiving the materials and giving its assessment.

9- It was well understood that it does not fit in the same category of the 6 outstanding issues. Therefore, it was reflected in a separated paragraph. Due to its specificity, no meeting for discussion, no interview, no visit to any location and no sampling was envisaged. As reflected in paragraph III

of the Work Plan, it was agreed that the Agency shall deliver the documents and Iran shall merely review and inform the Agency of its assessment.

10- The first paragraph of chapter IV of the Work Plan says: “These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.”

If there was an intention to raise any other issues in addition to the “alleged studies” such as possible military dimension (Green Salt, Re-entry missile /Warhead, High Explosive Test), then it should have been raised by the Agency in the course of negotiations on the Work Plan. Since all outstanding issues have been incorporated in the exhausted list by the IAEA during the negotiations, it becomes evident to anyone that no item entitled “possible military dimension” exists in the modalities.

11- The Agency has explicitly expressed in a written document dated 13 May 2008 that “Therefore no document establishing the administrative interconnections between “Green Salt” and two other remaining subjects on alleged studies, namely “High Explosive Testing” and “Re-entry Vehicle” have been delivered or presented to Iran by the Agency”. This explicit expression of the fact, which regrettably has not been reflected in the DG’s report, shows that in contrary to what had been said in the report, the documents related to the “alleged studies” lack internal consistency and coherence.

12- As reported by Director General in his previous and the present reports, the Agency was prevented by the United States to fulfill its obligation i.e. to deliver the documents to Iran. While expressing deep

regret, the Agency requested Iran to show flexibility and to accept power point presentation instead of receiving documents.

13- One of the examples that is simply understood by all public is the lack of any classification seals on such documents claimed to be related to a top secret and a “Manhattan-Nuclear weapon type project”! What a lousy job by the CIA! - forgetting to at least put ‘top secret’ stamps on their forged materials! No wonder they had to hastily prepare a package of new allegation including forged documents for the Board of Governors, on the eve of the positive report of the Director General on resolution of the question of source of contamination uranium particles in Natanz and his confirmation of Iran’s past declaration.

14- As reflected in the technical briefing on Tuesday, 16 September, by the Safeguards Department, there is no proof of authenticity of the documents on “alleged studies”. No original document exists too.

15- Contrary to the Work Plan which did not envisage any discussion, 7 rounds of technical meetings were held in Iran where in addition to thorough oral explanations, a 117-page clarification and response was given to the Agency proving that all material on “alleged studies” are forged and fabricated.

Mr. Chairman,

There are three simple questions:

1- What is the status quo?

2- Where are we possibly aiming at with the present trend?

3- Finally, what are we expected to do in order to put everything on the right track?

The answer to the first question i.e. the status quo is:

- No original and authentic document exists.
- The Agency has not been able to deliver any original of documents or materials on “alleged studies”.
- Iran has however fully implemented its commitments in accordance with the Work Plan.

The answer to the second question i.e. where are we aiming at if this boring endless process is pursued:

The mutual confidence and trust among Member States as well as Secretariat and Member States shall be at real risk, thus, the credibility and integrity of the Agency is in serious jeopardy.

The answer to the third question i.e. what are we expected to do now is:

The Agency is in a position to implement the last part of the Work Plan, which calls for turning the implementation of safeguards in Iran into routine manner since all measures stipulated in the Work Plan are fully implemented.

Mr. Chairman,

Based on above mentioned facts and according to the Work Plan the issue of “alleged studies” has been concluded. As envisaged in the paragraph 5 of the Work Plan which says: “The Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the above work plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran

will be conducted in a routine manner.”, the implementation of safeguards in Iran should be turned into a routine manner. Iran is of the belief that considering the provided detailed responses, the Agency is in a position to declare that attributed documents to the “alleged studies” lack authenticity and are baseless and forged and thus considers the issue as being concluded and in accordance with Work Plan considers implementation of safeguards in Iran to be in routine manner.

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

In conclusion, on behalf of my Government I declare that once the implementation of safeguards in Iran turns back to routine manner, the Islamic Republic of Iran, like other Member States, shall answer other questions, in such a new cooperative environment, in accordance with its obligations under the comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Thank you for your kind attention.