

**In the name of Allah,  
the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful**

**Statement by**

**Ambassador A.A. Soltanieh  
Resident Representative of Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the IAEA**

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VIENNA**

**Mr. Chairman,  
Distinguished Colleagues,**

**The Islamic Republic of Iran, as the main victim of chemical weapons has always been among the most active member states of international organizations such as the IAEA and party to the NPT. Iran attaches great importance to international cooperation in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Iran and other peace-loving, like-minded developing countries have expressed their serious concerns about development and employment of new advanced nuclear weapons by United State and United Kingdom. The recent initiative of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran on nuclear disarmament during the United Nations General Assembly which paved the way for the adoption of the UNGA resolution calling the implementation of the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, specially establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Middle East, confirms Iran's determination to work with other countries towards total elimination of nuclear warheads which exist in Nuclear Weapon States. The Nuclear Weapon States are totally**

**ignoring the serious concern of the international community. The Nuclear Weapons States are highlighting the "non-proliferation" in order to overshadow and cover up the essential issue namely "nuclear disarmament" and the immediate threat of their nuclear arsenals to the global security.**

**The attention of the international community has been diverted from existence of hundreds of nuclear warheads and un-safeguarded nuclear installations mostly constructed and developed with full technical and financial support of US and some European countries in Israel to few issues regarding the research in Iran which are under full surveillance of the IAEA. Islamic Republic of Iran is party to NPT and is implementing NPT comprehensive safeguards for three decades and is voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol, whereas Israel has rejected to adhere to any disarmament treaties on Weapon of Mass Destruction, particularly NPT and to sign the IAEA Safeguards Agreements. Israel has not implemented over 30 resolutions of the IAEA and the United Nations calling her to observe international law and treaties and not to threaten the countries in the region. One could refer to strong condemnation of Israel through resolutions following the military attacks against nuclear installations in the region. This discriminatory status quo can not and must not be tolerated by the international community anymore.**

**Mr. Chairman,**

**During the last 27 years the Islamic Republic of Iran has spared no effort in cooperating with the Agency as far as its commitments under the NPT are concerned. Iran is the only Member State which voluntarily invited, in late 80s, the IAEA safeguards inspectors, headed by the DDG, to visit all sites and facilities at their discretion, even those locations not declarable under the Safeguards Agreement.**

**Islamic Republic of Iran is the only Member State that is implementing the Additional Protocol prior to ratification by its legislative body.**

**The short critical review of the developments particularly during past three years reveals the facts confirming the exclusive nature of Iranian nuclear program and activities and full cooperation with international community. It also shows that the international community has been, to a great extent, misled with bias, politicized and exaggerated information on Iranian nuclear programs and activities. Iranian nuclear issues, which should have been dealt in a purely technical manner within the framework of the IAEA, have been politicized.**

**The following international developments have had serious impacts on Iranian nuclear policies and activities:**

- The failure of the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNPICPUNE) in Geneva, in 1987.**
- The failure of the Committee on Assurances of Supply in the IAEA which was entrusted to establish internationally recognized principles and legally binding instruments to assure sustainable nuclear supply, in Vienna in 1987 after 7 years of intensive deliberations.**
- US was obliged under the contract made prior to 1979 to supply new fuel for Tehran 5 MW Research Reactor, being under the Agency comprehensive Safeguards, producing radioisotope for application in medicine, agriculture and industry. It neither gave the fuel nor the millions of dollars received for.**
- Iran is 10% share holder of the Enrichment Company, Eurodif in France, for the last three decades. Iran did donate one billion dollars to help the company from financial crisis but it has not received even a gram of the uranium produced in the factory in order to use in the research reactor and power plant.**

**Considering the aforementioned developments which proves the assertion of the lack of implementation of promotional pillars of Statute of the IAEA, Article III in particular, as well as provisions of the Article 4 of NPT along with continuous sanctions by certain countries, and the last but not the lack of any international legally binding instrument for assurances of nuclear fuel, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no choice other than to depend on its own resources and manpower in order to exercise its inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.**

**Mr. Chairman,**

**During last three years there have been tremendous progress in our cooperation with the IAEA. Let's have a short glance on the events since then:**

- Dr. ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA paid a visit to Iranian nuclear installations, particularly to the centrifuge enrichment facility in Natanz, in February 2003.**
- Following the visit of the Director General, swipe sampling of the centrifuge components were made by inspectors. The analysis showed low and high-enriched uranium particles.**
- Iran claimed that the source of contamination is of foreign origin.**
- In order to give the IAEA chance to conduct technical activities proving that the allegations are baseless and with the aim of decreasing the political tension, Iran voluntarily decided to suspend its enrichment activities.**
- While full cooperation with the IAEA was going on, Iran entered into constructive dialogue with almost all Member States of the IAEA such as the members of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), European Union, Russia and China with the aim of removing ambiguities on the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.**
- There has always been consensus in the IAEA, particularly in the Board of Governors, that the suspension of enrichment activities is a voluntary, non-legally binding measure. This essential non-**

**legally binding parameter has been reflected in Tehran and Paris Agreements between Iran and EU3/EU as well as all decisions, conclusions and even resolutions of the Board of Governors.**

**While appreciating the tremendous constructive work by the IAEA, and sincere attempts by Director General Dr. ElBaradei and his staff in resolving the issues, Iran has however serious concerns about the misunderstandings, confusions, misperceptions and the underestimation of great progress so far made on political grounds.**

**Short list of constructive and cooperative measures is as follows:**

- Iran has had close collaboration with the IAEA in many cases beyond its legal obligations, such as granting more than 28 accesses to military sites and workshops, facilitating interviews with several individuals.**
- Iran intensified multilateral diplomacy with the Agency's Member States, members of Non-aligned Movement and European Union, China, Russia and other members of the Board of Governors with the aim of removing ambiguities.**
- Iran has proactively cooperated with the Agency in an extraordinary manner during the last two years with almost continuous inspections, amount to over 1500 man-day inspection, which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA.**
- In an historical and unprecedented gesture, Iran decided to voluntarily and temporarily suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in order to give the Agency opportunity to perform its technical activities including sampling and analysis of the contaminated samples at Natanz.**
- Director General in his report to the Board of Governors confirmed that "Since December 2003, Iran has facilitated in a timely manner Agency access under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear materials and facilities, as well**

as other locations in the country, and has permitted the Agency to take environmental samples as requested by the Agency.

- **The Director General informed the Board that "Since October 2003, Iran's cooperation has improved appreciably".**

**The following major measures by Iran are the basis of his assessment:**

- **Signature of the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003;**
- **Voluntary provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, from 18 December 2003, prior its ratification, as if Iran has ratified it;**
- **Complementary access (more than 20) in accordance to the Additional Protocol, in many cases with 2 hours notice or less;**
- **Full and unrestricted access to all nuclear material and all facilities, in particular to the Enrichment Facility at Natanz, Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan;**
- **Provision of detailed information in connection with the imports of nuclear material and components related to the centrifuge and laser enrichment activities;**
- **Providing full detail information on the chronologies, activities, researches, progress reports regarding the enrichment activities, uranium conversion, plutonium separation, mining and milling, research reactor, heavy water production;**
- **Providing accesses to military sites following the allegations by a certain country and the opposition terrorist group supported by it. The inspection proved the allegations to be baseless;**
- **In October 2003, the Agency was granted to visit two military industrial complex called Kolehdoz and Kazemi that had been announced by terrorist group (MKO, NRCI) as relevant**

to enrichment activities. Following its inspection, the Agency reported in para 49 of GOV/2005/67: The results did not reveal any indications of activities involving the use of nuclear material;

- In June 2004, the Agency was granted to visit the military complex of Lavisan-Shian and two others military sites namely Malek Ashtar and Novin Center where the Agency took environmental samples. As DG reported in para 102 of GOV/2004/83: "...the vegetation and soil samples collected from the Lavisan-Shian site have been analyzed and reveal no evidence of nuclear material";
- In January and November 2005, free access was granted to Parchin Military site. Environmental samples were taken. The Director General then reported that the results showed no indication of presence of nuclear material and that the Agency's inspectors did not see any relevant fuel-use equipment or material;
- Provision of information on Heavy Water Production Plant, prior to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, where Iran was not yet obliged to do so under its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INCIRC/153);
- Submission of more than 1000 pages of the initial declarations of the Additional Protocol on 21 May 2004 and subsequently routinely updated the declarations, which have been verified by the Agency.
- Full implementation of the Additional Protocol, included performed more than 20 complementary accesses some with short notices of 2 hours or less during the past two years;
- IAEA has confirmed that it has not found any evidence that Iranian nuclear materials and activities are diverted to prohibited purposes;
- All nuclear materials are accounted for;

- **Iran decided to take a major proactive step, suspending voluntarily its enrichment activities, in order to give a chance for the Agency to perform technical analysis of the samples;**
- **The IAEA has confirmed, as reported by DG (GOV2005/67), that the sources of HEU contamination are outside of Iran. It is proved that the HEU particles are not resulted from enrichment in Iran;**
- **Iran is implementing the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol as if it has ratified it;**

**It is of a great concern and disappointment that the more Iran did cooperate and took additional steps, transparency measures, beyond its legal obligations, the more stringent Safeguards were applied, the more outstanding questions were resolved, language of the proposed resolutions by US and EU3 became tougher.**

**At the eve of the meetings of the Board of Governors, the US political campaign against Iran is augmented with baseless allegations. It is somehow disappointing that the active cooperation of Iran in granting prompt access to military sites, being directly related to national security, has not been duly reflected in the reports to the Board of Governors as well as the public.**

**Considering the facts that:**

- **The bitter past history of monopoly, sanctions as well as the lack of any international legally binding instrument for assurances of nuclear supply;**
- **As reflected in NAM declarations and even the resolutions, even the last resolution adopted by the Special Board of Governors, the suspension of all related enrichment activities are a voluntary and non-legally binding as a confidence building measure;**



- **The existence of scientifically well justified and technically reliable mechanisms and sophisticated surveillance equipment at the IAEA' Safeguards Department, capable of verifying the declared enrichment activities and the levels of enrichment, and giving assurance that such activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes;**
- **As stipulated in article III of the Statute of the IAEA and the article IV of the NPT the state parties have full & inalienable right to conduct research on peaceful nuclear energy. As envisaged in article II, "The Agency shall seek to accelerate and encourage the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". The article III authorizes the Agency to "encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world".**

**There is no reason for Iran to sustain its frustrated voluntary suspension of the R&D on enrichment as the result of which it would further be deprived from its inalienable right to work on nuclear fuel cycle, with the aim of producing required fuels for its research reactors and nuclear power plants.**

**I refer distinguished colleague to documents INFCIRC/657 and INFCIRC/665 for comprehensive information on this issue.**

**After more than two and a half years of voluntary suspension, the triggering issue of contamination being resolved, there is no reason for the Iranian Government to further deprive its nation from its inalienable right in doing research. The Agency was thus informed on 3 January 2006 that it will resume R&D as 10 January 2006, and requested the Agency to conduct timely and necessary preparations. Iran reiterated that such activities would be conducted in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement of Iran with the IAEA. It further informed it that R&D is in small scale and not planned for nuclear fuel production. Thus, the suspension of enrichment on commercial**

scale, started since 2003, will be sustained.

## **Conclusion:**

**Reiterating that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the nuclear weapons option is not in Iran's Defense Doctrine, it once again declares that it is determined to continue its full cooperation with the IAEA and implementation of its obligations under the Agency's Safeguards provided that Iran is not deprived from its inalienable right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear fuel cycle and research and development, as envisaged in the Agency's Statute and the NPT. At the same time, Iran has always been ready to remove ambiguities on its nuclear activities. In this context Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to enter into negotiation on "Non-diversion of commercial large scale enrichment to military purposes" in and constructive and serious manner with well defined time frame. If, however, a historical mistake is made by some members of the Board of Governors in sending Iran's nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council, that is outside the framework of the IAEA, as referral or report or for the information purposes which mean involving UN Security Council, the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran has to implement the law passed in the parliament, a democratic institution, almost by consensus, to the effect that it has to suspend all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA. Needless to say that Iran will continue its cooperation with the IAEA in accordance with the NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards. My Government considers the decision of reporting or referral to UNSC as a political decision by EU3. Permit me to comment on the statement made by distinguished Ambassador of Germany on behalf of EU3:**

**- Suspension was voluntary and non-legally binding measure,**

**- EU3 always assured that they are committed to Tehran and Paris Agreements to the effect that nuclear fuel cycle and enrichment be temporary suspended not a permanent cessation,**

**- The EU3 proposal explicitly denying Iran's right for nuclear fuel cycle was in contravention to the Paris Agreement. H.E. Dr. Rohani had in June 2005 in Germany informed that if the proposals do not include Fuel Cycle it will be rejected. Therefore, negotiations based on Paris Agreement were put in halt by EU and not by Iran. Since according to Paris Agreement, suspension was linked to negotiation, thus Iran was not anymore left obliged to its bilateral Paris Agreement. However, H.E. Dr. Larijani, the Secretary of Supreme National Council, took the initiative and invited EU3 to come back to negotiation table.**

**- Iran announces its readiness to negotiate with all Member States, EU3 in particular, in order to remove any ambiguities.**

**- As regards the statement by the representative of the U.S., I refrain from going into details but only focus on few points due to time constraint:**

**1- How could the international community including Iranian people believe that U.S. regime and present administration in particular, which has a long history of unilateral policy, the only country using nuclear weapons and the turning innocent Japanese into ashes, military invasion of Iraq despite of the opposition of international community and the U.N., that the declaration by the U.S. Ambassador that passing the issue to United Nations Security Council is on the way to diplomacy. Sending the issue outside of the IAEA framework and involving UNSC will definitely undermine the essential role and the authority of the Agency and the tremendous impartial and professional attempts by Dr. ElBaradei, recently receiving Nobel Peace Prize which he certainly deserves. He has and could, with his competent staff continue joint work with Iran's operation towards prompt conclusion. Involvement of the UN Security Council would put the Agency's role in serious jeopardy.**

**Mr. Chairman,**

**My Delegation is of the view, that by the request of the US Ambassador for making the confidential DDG Report public ...**

**Iranian people are victim of terrorist activities and 8 years war imposed on Iran by Saddam, fully supported by US and by certain countries. Iran has always been concerned about highly confidential information which is only available to the Agency's inspectors, trusting them to observe the principle of protection of confidentiality. In addition, I have to express concern of selectivity of only reflecting part of the information and not the cooperation by Iran on these sensitive issues. The international community has the right to see both sides of the coin, i.e. the full information.**

**With respect to the statement of the distinguished Governor of Australia, I just refer her to all previous reports of the DG, that reflect the fact that opensource information where reported, but after the Agency work, inspection and sampling all proved to be baseless, the said cases are the same, and I assure that they are all baseless allegations. We have been and are working in the spirit of cooperation beyond our obligations to prove the correctness of our assertion. We, however, were surprised at the Report of the DDG which was clear indication of big progress since the last Board meeting, including accession to additional military sites. It was expected that a few colleagues, highlighting few questions to impartially, appreciate the cooperation made.**

**As regards to the phase "non-compliance" I refer the distinguished Board Members once again to review carefully the text of the Statute and the Safeguards Agreement.**

**Iran was not obliged to report on many activities as concealment, since under INFCIRC/153 Iran was only obliged to inform the Agency 180 day before nuclear material was fed to the facilities. When we started**

**construction of UCF and Natanz facilities, the Additional Protocol and subsidiary arrangements were not signed and not in force.**

**As stipulated in Art XII.C, only inspectors having access to the sites, and confidential information, utilizing advanced surveillance systems, will be in a position to report noncompliance to DG where he would then report to the Board of Governors. Distinguished DG has never reported and used the term noncompliance, but the term “failures” where he also reported that corrective measures have been made.**

**Last but not least, I would like to emphasize that this dispute is not between Iran and the international community, when NAM countries, comprising of 100 members of the IAEA, for the last three years have always supported the inalienable right for peaceful use of nuclear energy and express satisfaction of the progress made following the cooperation between Iran and IAEA. This dispute is politically motivated - and once imposed on Iran, other developing countries will follow - by certain countries who want to continue the monopoly in nuclear technology.**

**The majority of Member States and distinguished Director General are hereby requested to spare no effort at this historical juncture not to permit the deviation of constructive cooperative track to confrontation route to occur.**

**Thank you for your attention.**