

In the name of God

**Islamic Republic of Iran Statement**

Board of Governors June 2005

Madame Chair,

As this is the first time that I am taking the floor, I would like to congratulate Dr. ElBaradei for his re-election. I am sure that Dr. ElBaradei would continue to lead this Organization through his formidable professionalism, impartiality and vast experience in achieving its objectives.

It was a pleasure to see the Deputy Director-General Mr. Pierre Goldschmidt once again at the podium here and yet it is a source of dismay that he would soon be leaving the Agency. I would like to congratulate Mr. Heinonen for assumption of this important post and to assure him of our continued cooperation.

I have also to express the condolences of my delegation for the sad demise of H.E. Ambassador Moleah of South Africa to the members of his family and the distinguished delegation of South Africa.

The oral technical report by Mr. Goldschmidt indicates the extent of the work that has been done since the previous Board meeting which has resulted in bringing the remaining few issues and questions closer to final conclusion.

Two key issues have been pending, as of late, which are interlinked. Ever since the process of verification under the current format started, the question of the origin of some low enriched uranium as well as traces of high enriched uranium have been the major and fundamental points based on which concerns have been raised by the Agency and the Board of Governors. We maintained, from the outset, that Iran had not conducted such enrichment activities with

the centrifuges aside from those reported in our October 21, 2003 statement. As we saw it, the only possible source for the LEU and HEU traces should have been contamination from outside sources. The Agency had already concluded in the past that this assertion is viable.

We are grateful that, with assistance of third countries, the Agency has now had the chance to physically inspect some centrifuges or components which are apparently of the same type as those acquired by Iran.

Once this is achieved, the other questions related to verifying Iran's centrifuges enrichment programme should also be moved to a final conclusion. Some questions may still remain pending on specific points related to the work of the intermediates. To this end, we have provided whatever available at our disposal to the Agency and we will not hesitate, to make every efforts to clarify ambiguities, if any.

We need to note, however, that these remaining questions are not directly related to the issues at hand and that Iran has already provided, way beyond its safeguards and Additional Protocol obligations, information, evidence, documents with detailed specifics of the process to the Agency. As such, the Agency and the Board of Governors can be certain that Iran has no reason, whatsoever, to withhold related information. Bearing that in mind, we will continue to do whatever that we can, and search wherever possible, to convey any other information that may surface to the Agency.

On matters related to transparency, we wish to stress that Iran has already been extremely forthcoming on providing access and information to locations unrelated to the nuclear activities which were alleged through scanty reports in certain media to have been engaged in undeclared programmes. In every single case it was established that the hype created through the media was nothing but hoax. We are willing and prepared to continue to consider matters related to transparency, in accordance with our obligation under the IAEA's statute, NPT Safeguards as well as the provisions of the Additional Protocol which is voluntarily implemented by Iran.

I have to remind the fact that the voluntary suspension, being non-legally binding, as confidence building measures, remains in force for the time being, has been verified by the Agency. Iran is voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol as if Iran has ratified it. Over 1000 pages of initial declarations, in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, have been submitted to the Agency and are verified. Furthermore, over 20 complimentary accesses in accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol, mostly with short notice of two hours, have been so far granted. I refrain to go into more details of our extensive cooperation with the IAEA to say that more than 1200 man-day-inspections have been conducted in Iran during the last two years, which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA.

On the larger picture, I believe most of the Governors here are already informed about the state of negotiations between Iran and the three European countries and the EU. Iran has put forward a comprehensive framework which incorporates guarantees on all the issues which have been subject to negotiations, i.e. guarantees from Europe and guarantees from Iran. On ways and means that would provide the objective guarantees on our nuclear programme we have been particularly forthcoming and we have presented measures which would, with a high level of confidence, ascertain the peaceful nature of our programme.

Our European interlocutors, after consideration of the framework, have suggested that they will prepare a counter proposal which would be developed and presented some time next month. The nuclear fuel production is a central part of any potential mutual acceptable agreement. We will of course render every effort to arrive at such an agreement. Time however is of essence and we cannot keep our peaceful nuclear facilities idle for much longer.

Thank you.