

**Statement by H.E. Dr. A. Zamaninia Director-General for International  
Political Affairs Of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic  
Republic of Iran Before the Board of Governors of the IAEA Vienna-18  
June 2004**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me to begin by expressing our sincere appreciation to the Director General, the Secretariat and the inspectors for their tireless efforts and assure them of our full confidence and commitment to continue cooperation with them to bring this issue to a prompt closure.

It has been over a year that the IAEA started its robust inspections of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most issues have already been clarified, and the two remaining questions are fast approaching clarity.

But we should not lose sight of how and in what atmosphere this process started. The process started in a deliberately charged political atmosphere. Wild and illusionary allegations of a secret Iranian nuclear weapons program appeared on heavy daily doses. They were repeated so often -albeit primarily by one power with a heavy hand and a huge arsenal of global media campaign --that they were taken as irrefutable facts. The task was to simply find the evidence, a smoking gun so to speak.

The Agency, faced with enormous pressure that its credibility would be tarnished by succumbing to Iran's so-called skillful deceit, had to take the cautious road. It was taught a lesson very early on, when it simply asserted in its November 2003 report to the Board that "to date there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities...were related to a nuclear weapons program"

This modest but significant observation by the Agency became the subject of unrestrained attacks and intimidation by some officials of a country who had already decided what the facts were or should be. This august Board also sent a message of its own, by incorporating almost every damaging assertion in that report in its November resolution, but not even referring to that most important finding, despite the insistence of the overwhelming majority of the members of the Board, particularly the Non-Aligned.

Those days are behind us. Today, and after over 670 person-days of intrusive inspections and robust verification, that finding continues to be valid. The Agency has not changed or reversed it, while for obvious reasons, it has avoided the humiliation of repeating it. In fact, the very nature of the questions and problems have changed.

I invite the distinguished members of the Board to once again read the latest report and its annex and compare them to the original allegations.

The questions and concerns today are:

- ./ Not whether Iran has the bomb or whether a smoking gun can be found. Everyone knows the answer is no, whatever pretence they put on;
- ./ Not whether Iran produced or received high enriched uranium, but where exactly each and every particle in the contaminated imported equipment came from;
- ./ Not whether the infamous P2 "discovery" was related to a secret nuclear weapons program being conducted in the much drummed up "military sites", but in fact when the conclusions of the Agency's inspectors confirming the accuracy of Iranian accounts can be assessed and finalized;
- ./ Not whether Iran was engaged in systematic deception, but whether Iran had to read the minds of the careful inspectors on what they wanted to know in order to be "proactive" rather than responding to inquiries;
- ./ Not whether Iran told the inspectors where it got its imported parts, but whether private contractors had been "proactive" enough in providing to the inspectors a list of all the inquiries that they made, whether or not they even received a reply;
- ./ And may be most importantly, not whether Iran was prepared to voluntarily suspend its rightful enrichment activities in order to alley the sense of urgency that had been drummed up, but whether Iran or any other country for that matter is prepared to accept an arbitrarily defined new monopoly...

Why did it happen?

Because the Board was lead to believe that Iran's less than full transparency in the preceding years in disclosing all its nuclear activities was motivated by a grand scheme to conceal a weapons program rather than a fact of daily life -and a nation-wide defensive mechanism against unilateral sanctions --that includes not only the nuclear field but everything from drug enforcement to civil aviation safety and

even to humanitarian mine clearance operations. The Board was lead to believe that that there must be ulterior evil and illegal motives for a widespread practice of discrete procurement in all fields that has been imposed on Iran by unilateral all-encompassing illegal sanctions; sanctions that themselves violate the NPT among other international and bilateral instruments.

Mr. Chairman,

While a careful reading of the report clearly establishes the claims that I just made, we need to set the record straight on a number of assertions and remarks in the oral and written report, that have found their way right into the draft resolution. We are confident that these assertions and remarks emerged inadvertently and in spite of the best efforts of the secretariat and the inspectors to provide a correct picture. That is why we have shared the evidence with the Agency in all cases and have sought clarification from the secretariat. We appreciate the courage of the secretariat in providing a partial correction and we hope that further clarifications on similarly documented cases will be forthcoming.

## **1- Less than Satisfactory Engagement and Proactive Cooperation?**

Over 670 person-days of unrestricted inspections have been carried out in Iran since February 2003, amounting to one of the most robust and intrusive verifications in the history of the Agency. In spite of the fact that the complementary access envisaged in Article 4 of the Additional Protocol could legally be granted only after the declarations have been submitted to the Agency, Iran voluntarily granted 12 complementary accesses even prior to the submission of its declarations, most of which with 2 hour notice or even less.

It needs to be borne in mind that lack of identified or known criteria or timelines, on the basis of which Iran could organize itself for robust inspections, has required Iran to provide information or to grant access primarily after requests were made by the Agency. However, in the spirit of cooperation and as confirmed in the report of the Director General, action has been taken to satisfy the requests of the Agency in the fullest and most speedy manner possible.

## **2- Incomplete Information and lack of Clarity?**

### **2-1-P-2 Program**

As clarified by the secretariat on 17 June 2004, the evidence and records of the meetings and interviews conducted by the Agency, clearly illustrate that the

observation in the Report indicating that information about P2 "in some cases continues to involve changing or contradictory information" are without any justification. We have shared the evidence with the Secretariat, and believe that the mistake has been inadvertent. As this mistake has led to a very serious conclusion and significant impact on the draft resolution, we sought a correction. It is now clear that Iran did not change its information on the origins of the magnets or the locations where various parts of the P-2 were built. Unfortunately the corrections that were made by the Secretariat did not lead even to the necessary factual modifications in the draft resolution. Moreover, the clarifications provided by the secretariat understandably included new ambiguities which require clarifications. Allow me to explain:

- First on the number of magnets: The total number of magnets in question is about 150 and not the stated 4000 which has been the subject of much fanfare and an extremely unfortunate statement in an informal meeting here. We of course noted the expression of regret, but we wonder why the news media did not pick it up. Even of the 150, about 100 were low quality and only about 50 were usable. The 100 pieces had been purchased at about 4 dollars per magnet and the better quality ones at 7 dollars a piece.

- The statement contends that Iran acknowledged in May for the first time that it had sought to procure 4000 magnets and shown interest in acquiring up to 100000 more. This issue has been thoroughly explained by the contractor to the apparent satisfaction of the inspectors. Two issues need to be amplified here:

- 1) The private contractor explained to the inspectors that to buy an item which costs less than 10 dollars a piece from a European company, he needed to make it financially attractive and he did so by promising the purchase of huge amounts. This entire episode may be amusing to those who have not been subjected to the type of illegal sanctions that private and public Iranians are facing in procuring the most elementary equipment from abroad. But it is a common fact of life in every sphere of Iran's economic activity.

- 2) To fault an Iranian contractor for not knowing that he had to volunteer information not only on his actual purchases --which he did --but in fact about his unsuccessful inquiries is less than fair.,

- Second with regard to the March report and Iranian Statements: While in the meeting of January 28, a complete picture on the origins of magnets were presented to the inspectors, "the issue of the import of the magnet gained significance for the secretariat only in May." In other words, the primary issue during the preceding discussions was what had been acquired from the intermediary. That constituted the primary focus of the inspectors, and the secretariat, and that is why every statement by Iran as well as the March report of

the secretariat were seen in that light. In the communication *INFCIRC/628* and other Iranian statements, it is crystal clear from the wording or the context, that Iran only reiterated that it has not received any P-2 component *from the intermediary*. The magnets purchased did not originate from the intermediary but from an Asian company, which the Agency has already acknowledged in its report. Building on this as a justification for the assertion of incompleteness or lack of clarity is misleading.

## **2-1- Laser Enrichment**

Another inadvertent mistake in the report about the consistency of Iranian declarations on the levels of laser enrichment has expectedly found its way in the draft. We have shared the evidence with the Secretariat and the DDG for Safeguards in his briefing of the Board on 10 June 2004 and tried to indicate that there may have been a mistake on this issue by the Agency. However, the facts are incontrovertible and the incorrect information has stayed in the draft. In our view, the Board deserved a more unambiguous statement of the facts on this issue by the Secretariat as well. Let me explain:

- In the letter of 21 October 2003 to the Director General, Iran informed the Agency that "In the course of the operation of the CSL, about 8kg of U-metal was evaporated in the chambers and the enrichment separation envisaged in the contract, and in some experiments higher enrichments, were achieved in mg."
- During the first interview with the Agency inspectors, held in this regard on 28 October 2003, the Iranian laser specialist stated, "we were able to achieve the goal of the contract and even obtained *double digits* enrichment occasionally".
- While it is clear that since October 2003, Iran has been referring to "higher achievements" and even "double digit" enrichment, it remains a mystery how the word "slightly" found its way in the November report, only to become a reference point in para 33 of the current report alluding to inconsistency.
- The draft resolution, using this as its point of departure, has taken a step further calling it omission without the slightest justification from the report in its present form let alone the real story.

- It is worth noting, in any case, that experts in laser enrichment technology are well aware of the fact that due to tuning and well running of the equipments, one could occasionally obtain particles with higher enrichment factor (such as 15% reflected in the report or even higher figures) in some regions of the collection plate which by no means is an indication of capability of the system in continuous and long time running.

### **3-Delay in Inspections and Sampling of P-2 Components?**

There is a widely reported contention that Iran delayed inspections for one months. It has also been asserted that this "resulted in a delay in the taking of environmental samples and their analysis." This again found its way in the resolution. The facts that have been shown to the Agency do not support neither contention and we expected clarifications on this issue as well. Allow me to elaborate:

- During the period in question, the Agency inspectors arrived in Iran on March 27, 2004 and not mid April. Various inspectors have almost continuously been in Iran since March.
- The requested delay until 10 April pertained solely to the implementation of then newly announced suspension measures and not to any other activity, including other suspension measures. Iran stated clearly in its note-Verbale dated 15 March 2004 that "*With regard to the verification of other activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran the inspectors of the Agency can travel to Tehran on 27 March 2004.* "
- As for delays in P-2 sampling, there was no impediment for the inspectors to visit or take samples from the P2 components or locations involved in P2 program since 27 March 2004.
- During the period in question, the Agency inspectors, by their own choice, did not inspect P2 components before mid April 2004 and even then did not take such samples which in the report is regarded as crucially important and urgently required. The inspectors only took almost a month later in mid May.

### **4-Scope of Suspension of Enrichment Activities**

As a confidence building measure and pursuant to the agreement with the three European countries in October 2003, Iran decided to voluntarily suspend

enrichment activities, while at the same time stressing its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology including in the field of enrichment. The scope of its voluntary measures were expanded by Iran in March 2004, following a subsequent agreement, in order to remove any impediment for the speedy normalization of the situation within the IAEA. Iran stated in absolutely clear terms the scope of its voluntary confidence-building measures in its letters of 29 December 2003 and 24 February 2004, and invited the Agency to verify the measures specified in those letters. Despite numerous technical and contractual difficulties, Iran has implemented both decisions in their entirety and in good faith and provided extraordinary and unrestricted access to the Agency for verification of the suspension.

The Agency has confirmed in its current report that it has witnessed no activity inconsistent with Iran's voluntary decisions. With regard to the private workshops that have continued production of components, contractual problems did not allow timely suspension of their activity. The possibility of contractual problem leading to such cases as well as the remedy, which was fully implemented, had both been clearly stipulated in the letter of 24 February 2004. Thus, any insinuation that Iran's implementation of its voluntary decision has been anything less than comprehensive is factually erroneous.



At the same time, it must be clearly understood that Iran took these measures in order to enhance international confidence and obviously as a confidence building exercise the collateral cannot be greater than the possible gain . Iran has attained the capability to enrich uranium through the hard work and intellectual capability of its scientist and in spite of multifaceted illegal restrictions that it has faced throughout the past two and a half decades. It will not abandon its peaceful technology, nor will it accept artificial, self-serving, and politically manipulated criteria to purport to do that by excluding Iran from any eventual IAEA working group or other mechanism in this field.

The balance between rights and obligations under the NPT and the IAEA statute is the main guarantee for the credibility and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Arbitrary and self-serving attempts to create new monopolies and deprive NPT States parties from an important area of peaceful nuclear technology undermine the basic foundations of the very system they purport to strengthen.

## **The Road Ahead**

Mr. Chairman,

I made these observations only to show the complexity of the process and alert my distinguished colleagues here that a small inadvertent mistake or omission by the secretariat can lead to dramatic conclusions only to be picked up by the watchful eyes who want to pick words here and there and insert them in the resolution or to make a propaganda bonanza.

We appreciate the courage of the secretariat in their explanations yesterday. The ambiguities and overstretched qualifications are understandable. But the impact of the mistakes and ensuing conclusions in the report on the overall atmosphere in the Board and the very direction and the entire fabric of the draft resolution is self-evident. With a report without these mistakes and ensuing conclusions a normalization in this Board meeting was not only achievable but imperative. This was not to be.

Now, the Board has a resolution that is alien to the real situation on the ground as observed and verified by the inspectors --placing the Board on less than solid grounds in adopting this resolution. Therefore, one or two minor changes in the wording of the draft to nominally acknowledge the new information brought to the

attention of the Board today cannot remedy the very serious wrong that this draft does, not just to Iran, but in fact to the entire process, putting it in jeopardy.

Who should be blamed for this? The inspectors who have been working hard and are naturally entitled to make mistakes? Or those who have systematically ruined the sound and impartial environment required for such heavy investigations by purring the market with their flawed prejudgments being exerted to the minds of everybody -including inspectors- on a daily basis including through media bias?

Mr. Chairman

We have the utmost respect for the impartiality and professionalism of the Agency and its Director General, secretariat and inspectors. We have done our best to provide them with all they need so that this joint task that Iran and the Agency have embarked upon together can come to a prompt closure.

This objective is very much achievable if not already at hand. The oral and written report of the Director General, read carefully, indicate beyond doubt that the Agency has made significant progress in concluding the clarification of the two remaining issues, namely the P-2 and contamination. Allow me to make a few remarks.

**First on P2:** There were three rounds of intensive discussions between the Agency inspectors and the private contractor who worked on P-2 R&D, the last of which took place on 30 May 2004. The Agency's inspectors confirmed their conclusion during the wrap up meeting with Iranian officials on 2 June 2004 that Iranian statements on P2 R&D are consistent with their findings. They were convinced about the *'feasibility of carrying out centrifuge test based on P-2 design -which required the procurement of parts from abroad and manufacturing of casing and centrifuge components within stated time period'*.

Therefore, from the point of view of the inspectors, which requires final assessment in Vienna, the issue has been substantively clarified.

It is important to note that the Director General in his oral presentation of 14 June 2004 before this Board carefully stated that, "additional information on the P-2 centrifuge issue was being provided by Iran, which we are currently assessing. We have also taken environmental samples relevant to this issue, which are currently undergoing analysis. I do hope that this information will help us in understanding and clarifying all issues relevant to the P-2 programme." We welcome his public comment that this issue will be resolved by September and we are confident that

yesterday's clarification by the DDG-Safeguards will further expedite the closure of this issue.

**Second, on Contamination:** As mentioned in the Report, the issue of contamination is a complex matter, which deals with the traces of particles and not nuclear material.

Iran consistently maintained that the source of contaminations are solely from imported contaminated parts received from the intermediaries and that Iran has not been able to enrich uranium by gas centrifuge machines beyond %1.2 U-235.

The Agency, in spite of ups and downs in previous reports, has now reached more serious conclusions as a result of further analysis of samples. These conclusions support the consistent Iranian contention about the source. A clear example is the latest report of analysis of samples dated 15 May 2004, in which the Agency informed that "Generally these findings support the State statement that 54% BEU originates from the imported centrifuge parts."

Iran has no doubt that the origin of the 36% contamination is also from the imported centrifuge parts. Taking more samples from the parts -which has been very limited up till now in spite of our insistence --will once again prove the correctness of Iran's contention. This is particularly the case because we have witnessed a gradual evolution of Agency's views on the locations where 36% contamination has been found. It was originally claimed on 27 October 2003 that such contamination was found only in one room, while in the current report it is clear that that contamination has been located in different locations and on imported components. The cooperation of other states will help expedite the resolution of this issue.

Mr. Chairman,

The resolution just adopted by the Board is a major departure from the realities on the ground and the report. Its pre-set tone and content coupled with the lax attitude towards facts indicate the resurgence of a political desire to derail the process. A number of elements in the preamble and operative paragraphs 7 and 8 concerning UF6 and a research heavy water reactor, regardless of the modifications in wording, violate the letter and spirit of the NPT and the IAEA statute. This is the first instance in the history of the Agency that a member-state is being asked, in whatever wording, to restrain exercise of its right particularly with a regard to a facility which had been declared and has been under full and comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Board must be aware of the precedent it is setting, despite the objection of the majority of its own members represented by NAM. I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation to the NAM chapter in Vienna and its troika for their position of principle and tireless efforts.

Mr. Chairman,

Let me conclude by making 6 brief final points:

1. Iran is committed as a matter of national security y imperative to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
2. Nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defense or security y doctrine.
3. Hundreds of person-days of intrusive and robust inspections has affirmed time and again that the original assessment of the Agency is still correct and will remain so.
4. More samplings and more analysis will only further illustrate our point about the foreign source of contamination. This can well be done within the framework of safeguards and the Additional Protocol.
5. Through full transparency and cooperation by Iran since October 2003 coupled with intensive and robust verification by the Agency, there is now sufficient confirmation to enable the Agency to begin a normal process of verification in accordance with the normal implementation of the Additional Protocol in a technical and not political environment.

6. We will examine our voluntary confidence building measures in light of the degree of implementation of the reciprocal commitments of our partners and make appropriate decisions.