

In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Colleagues,

My delegation views the resolution adopted today with a strong sense of realism and at the same time with mixed feelings. On the one hand, we note that the tone and content of some paragraphs are influenced more by the politics of the past twenty four years and less by the facts that Iran reported to the Agency and were reflected in the Director-Generals' Report. For the very same reason, the most important conclusion of the report, that is "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities... were related to a nuclear weapon program", was not incorporated in the resolution. On the other hand, we note that the unflinching attempts to create a crisis about Iran's peaceful nuclear program were offset by this resolution.

This resolution is a selective reflection of the Director-General's report; a report which my delegation along with the US and the Australian delegations did not like. Unlike the US or the Australian delegations and perhaps a couple of others, we did not like the Director-General's report not because we contested the facts and the conclusions of the report, or because we wanted to teach the Agency and its officials how to do their jobs. We did not think that the report was in part, "very questionable," or "more than unfortunate," because our academic experts did not like some of the report's conclusions. Rather, we were unhappy with the report because we thought that by focusing disproportionately on the past, the report was redundant in many ways and did not fully and distinctly reflect the turn of policy and action in Iran on the 21st of October.

The distinguished Ambassador of Japan pointed out that his country was the only victim of the use of nuclear weapons. This is an important historical fact that we **all** need to constantly bear in mind.

Given Japan's victimization by nuclear weapon, Japan's influence, economic prosperity and tranquility over the last two or three decades, the question is whether the mode of operation of the Agency has yet enabled it to conclude that Japan's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The answer – to the best of my knowledge-- is no. Therefore, to imply that the absence of that conclusion by the Agency about Iran's nuclear program, particularly at this early juncture, is technically significant is, in my view, less than objective and genuine.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran's commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is quite solid and it lies not only in its contractual obligations based on strategic defense doctrine, but also in the precepts of our faith.

We are determined to continue to work closely and actively with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues on the basis of the provisions of the Additional Protocol. We do look forward to enhancing international confidence and to promoting international cooperation in the field of nuclear technology in accordance with the NPT.

Our peaceful nuclear program, together with our failures to report our scientific experiments in the nuclear field, must be seen in the proper context of post-revolution domestic management and international politics. We, in Iran, had the courage to volunteer the information and admit that we failed to report what should have been reported to the Agency on the basis of our Safeguards Agreement. That is why I said in the beginning that we view this resolution with a strong sense of realism.

It is important to note that our unreported experiments were not illegal *per se*; they were all legitimate and benign scientific experiments of all kinds. The fact that we did not report and declare them was a failure. We have demonstrated our sense of responsibility for our failures by taking remedial measures and will continue to do so in full cooperation with the Agency.

Without attempting to shirk responsibility, I must say that in our discussions with many delegations here in the Board, there is a great deal of understanding for the dynamics of imposed restrictions that lie beneath this failure. Given the scope and severity of the ever-expanding illegal restrictions on Iran's access to nuclear technology, and other technologies for that matter, over the last quarter of a century, was Iran expected to forego its inalienable right altogether? Would any country on this Board have? The statements made here in this Board are a good illustration of the fact that non-proliferation regimes are two way streets where balance should be forged between the rights and responsibilities of each and every signatory.

The fact that Iran has remained loyal to the NPT and the objectives of the safeguards, despite its unwarranted deprivation from its fundamental right, demonstrates the depth of its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. It is hard to perceive that any other Member, facing similar restrictions, would have sustained unreserved commitment to the Treaty.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to make some concluding observations.

1- We have gone to unprecedented length in trying to secure the trust and winning the confidence of the international community by disclosing all our past peaceful nuclear activities and also declaring our willingness to sign the Additional Protocol. We expect that these essential steps will be reciprocated by ending all distortions about Iran's nuclear program and restrictions against its full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and lead to recognition of our peaceful nuclear capabilities through relevant international frameworks.

2- The independence and the objectivity of the Agency have to remain intact, so that it could discharge its responsibilities and functions in the fields of verification and promotional activities in peaceful nuclear technology.

3- For over two decades, Iran has been subject to one of the most severe series of illegal sanctions on material and technology for peaceful nuclear activities. As a result, our legal and peaceful nuclear program had no choice but to become discreet. While our obligations had to be observed, the slightest means to procure and produce our needs were, however, chased vigorously and suppressed violently.

4- One of the shortcomings in our Atomic Energy Organization, until few years ago, was the lack of the safeguards control and accountancy management. This has been one of the major reasons as to why the results of some of the lab scale research experiments were reported in the international journals while they were not reported to the Agency.

Mr. Chairman,

I spare you a lengthy exposé of our position, which is elaborated in a paper on why our nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. That paper is being made available to the Secretariat for circulation. I request that this statement and the exposé be reflected in the official records of this meeting and be circulated as an official document.

Thank You Mr. Chairman.